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Abstract
Ecofeminism offers a feminist perspective that links gender to how humans relate to the
natural world. As such, this framework explores the connections between the oppression of nature
and the oppression of women, such as widespread views that both women and nature are property,
are to be dominated, and are most valuable when cultivated and curated by men. I apply this
philosophical and sociological framework to judicial decision-making, where women judges
should view environmental issues as women’s issues and thus be more likely to vote in favor of
the environmental protections relative to her male peers. I evaluate this theory using a mixed
method design, focusing on environmental cases before the United States Supreme Court. Previous
studies on gender and judicial decision-making examine how cases pertaining to women’s issues
can alter a woman judge’s voting behavior; however, these studies have limited empirical analyses
to cases that typically are associated with women’s issues (e.g. reproductive rights, sex
discrimination, sexual harassment, etc.). I thus expand this definition of women’s issues and
examine the power dynamics between women (oppression) and the environment (extraction). I
first quantitatively analyze gendered voting patterns on the U.S. Supreme Court in environmental
cases. Second, I linguistically analyze a set of solo-authored dissenting opinions to evaluate
whether women authors differ in their language, attitudes, and framework pertaining to
environmental issues compared to their male judge peers.
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Chapter 1: Ecofeminism
Ecofeminism serves as a theory where feminist thought meets ecology through a multifaceted emphasis on humanity’s role in the environment through a feminist lens (Mies and Shiva
1993). Ecofeminism thus relies on a theme of ecological interdependence while synthesizing
prominent theories of oppression found in feminist literature. Ecofeminist philosophy is grounded
in the assumption that the exploitation and desire to dominate nature is equivalent to our society’s
exploitation of women (Mies and Shiva 1993). These parallels are highlighted by the conceptual
framework of basic beliefs and assumptions about women and nature that are rooted in the
patriarchy––specifically the dichotomies that maintain current power structures (such as man
versus woman, nature and society, etc.).
The term “ecofeminism” is often traced back to Françoise d’Eaubonne’s use of the term in
1974, though others argue that ecofeminism has its roots in peaceful activism beginning in 1970
(Mack-Canty 2004). Specifically, ecofeminism is tied to the Chipko Movement of the 1970’s in
which women living in villages located in Himalayan India protested the destruction of their
forests (Mack-Canty 2004). These peaceful protests were comprised almost entirely of women
who were protecting their natural resources by tying themselves to trees (Mack-Canty 2004). The
first link between women’s struggles––specifically those of indigenous women in developing
countries––and the environment is formed through these protests by women whose lives are
irrefutably tied to the resources that developed countries were attempting to exploit (Mack-Canty
2004).
Although ecofeminist activism was prominent in the 1970’s and 1980’s, ecofeminist theory
gained theoretical footing in the third wave of feminism that lasted throughout the late-1980’s and
1990’s (Mack-Canty 2004). The third wave of feminism was primarily led by women of color and
1

indigenous women, who rejected the universalization of feminism promoted by leaders of the
second wave of feminism (Mack-Canty 2004). Instead, the third wave of feminism acknowledged
that there are many differences among women, and these differences demand that feminism move
away from foundational theories and develop new theories of oppression that can account for the
different socio-political barriers that contribute to the continued oppression of women of color and
indigenous women (Mack-Canty 2004).
Ecofeminism began developing and incorporating theories based upon postcolonial
feminism. Postcolonial feminism argues that Western colonialism and its effects play a large role
in the oppression of women, racism, and environmental exploitation (Mack-Canty 2004).
Specifically, postcolonial feminism critiques the global capitalist system which promotes
“development” projects in developing countries and communities of color (Mack-Canty 2004).
For example, the nature versus culture dichotomy is a central tenet of most Western ideologies,
where “civilized” man is seen as having complete domination over “uncivilized” or primitive
nature (Mack-Canty 2004; Lahar 1991). This belief directly informed the development of classical
liberalism which brought about capitalism and colonialism (Mack-Canty 2004). The necessary
spread of “civilization,” and thus capitalism, mandated and justified colonization and the
exploitation of the environment, which holds value solely as a provider of resources for economic
gain.
Environmental extraction became the key to promoting and funding western colonization,
whereby extraction became a powerful form of domination and control. For instance, many
developing nations have relied on agriculture to sustain their economy; however, these developing
nations are subjected to pressure from the agricultural demands from developed (Western) nations
such that they are incentivized (i.e. forced) to become a monoculture industry to promote exports
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to provide these resources to developed (Western) nations (Lahar 1991). The transition to
monoculture prompts a developing country to abandon centuries-old agricultural practices and
techniques to favor the desires of the developed nations, such as being required to use genetically
modified seeds to produce the “ideal” crop and abandoning sustainable practices. Furthermore,
this relationship contributes to colonization where these developing nations internalize Western
beliefs viewing natural resources as a commodity, valued only in terms of extractable units to be
exploited (Lahar 1991).
Although humans appear to profit from the exploitation of the environment, capitalism also
designates individuals as units that can be extracted for economic gain denoted which labors were
valuable. This makes the value of people tied to their economic use. The demand for “viable”
individuals to participate in the labor force (i.e. men) reduces the value of women, who are
associated with less “civilized” and more “primitive” domestic work—which is rendered invisible,
unpaid, and expected labor from women (MacGregor 2004)––through both the devaluation of the
work and the people engaging in it. As a consequence, the devaluation of women causes a
significant increase in violence against women (Shiva 1989), higher rates of female infanticide
(Lahar 1991), and other mortality risks (Mack-Canty 2004).
Ecofeminism also highlights how the spread of western colonization further disseminated
socio-political narratives that dictate political priorities and create false dichotomies between
issues, where political goals and priorities are treated as trade-offs rather than complementary
(Lahar 1991). For example, politicians may argue that it is more important to invest time and
resources in the economy system rather than investing in environmental sustainability or
“women’s issues” like education or healthcare. Care and care-related activities or careers are of
lower value to a capitalist and liberal society, because they are seen as feminine (MacGregor 2004).
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Furthermore, ecofeminism critiques the prioritization of militarization, development of
nuclear energy and weapons, and dumping of environmental toxins as a direct result of western
colonization and the spread of capitalism (Mack-Canty 2004). Women, specifically women of
color, are usually the first to notice issues arising from the dumping of environmental toxins,
because they are at home for longer periods of time than men; therefore, women are also
disproportionately exposed to environmental toxins dumped by corporations and/or the
government (Mack-Canty 2004).
Based upon these critiques addressing destructive political behavior, ecofeminism seeks to
alter discourse and socio-political practices to emphasize the value of women and the environment
interdependently. Specifically, ecofeminism advocates for the adoption of an ecological civic
virtue that stems from women’s societal standards of care—or a politicized ethic of care (Curtin
1991). Care ethics emphasize the notion that women, specifically in a maternal lens, are the
individuals “who do the caring, nurturing, and subsistence work that sustains human life”
(MacGregor 2004, 58). This “barefoot epistemology” states that women’s “ways of knowing” are
inherently tied to life-affirming activities; therefore, women’s relation to nature, through their
labor, is drastically different than men’s (MacGregor 2004). Not only do women care about their
children, they also care about their environments, and women are more concerned with issues of
survival rather than power, unlike men (MacGregor 2004). Women have a higher epistemic
awareness of survival and protection of life; therefore, women are more inclined to protect natural
resources for the continued survival of their families (MacGregor 2004). Consequently, women
have a stronger ethical approach to the survival of the environment as their relation to nature is
fundamentally different than that of men (Salleh 1997). Through care ethics, women are also seen
as instruments of social change, because they can serve as the primary medium to transmit new
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social ideas to younger generations and can help develop an ethical societal standard for caring
about the environment (Merchant 1996).

5

Chapter 2: Ecofeminism & Judicial Decision Making
This chapter seeks to apply ecofeminism to theories of judicial decision-making and
evaluate the extent to which women judges diverge from their male peers in their decisions in
environmental cases. I first outline existing judicial theories on gendered decision-making. I then
offer a new theory of decision-making based upon ecofeminism, which I empirically examine
within the United States Supreme Court.
I. Different Voice Theory
Theories of gender and judicial decision making can be traced back to Carol Gilligan’s
(1982) psychological analysis on gender and moral development. Gilligan (1982) argued that
previous metrics for moral development were inherently masculine, because the indicators of
moral development were measured utilizing notions of autonomy, separation, rights, and rules
(Gilligan 1982). Instead, Gilligan (1982) found that the female subjects solved moral dilemmas by
emphasizing community, obligation, and responsibility (Gilligan 1982). These differences in
moral development between men and women may affect the way women perceive the law.
Because the political and legal philosophies on which the United States was founded are inherently
masculine––through promoting a moral frameworks based on autonomy, objectivity, and rights
(Sherry 1986), thereby excluding women’s moral frameworks based on community and care––
women should perceive the law differently and develop their own feminine jurisprudence (Sherry
1986).
Such a feminine jurisprudence is expected to not focus solely on issues pertaining to
women; instead, it encompasses all legal issues (Sherry 1986). When deciding cases, women
judges are expected to incorporate a contextual analysis that emphasizes individual circumstances
and allows bending of the rules (i.e. legal authorities, precedent, procedural rules, etc.) in order to
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provide the “correct” moral response (Sherry 1986). By incorporating their own life experiences,
women judges may also redefine liberty and reformulate rights (Binion 1991). A masculine
definition of liberty sees liberty as an inverse relationship between an individual and the
government’s power over that individual; however, women cannot find liberty or empowerment
through a lessening of government power, because women experience powerlessness in their
everyday lives and often require the state to step in on their behalf (Binion 1991).
Furthermore, feminine jurisprudence should also have no deference to ideology. Women
judges should only vote liberally when a liberal vote equates to protecting the community and
securing full participation in it (Sherry 1986); therefore, a judge’s vote should not be gauged on
whether the vote produces a liberal or conservative outcome across all cases.
Sherry (1986) tested this theory by analyzing differing votes between Justice O’Connor
and Chief Justice Rehnquist. O’Connor and Rehnquist frequently voted in similar ways, because
they both aligned ideologically; therefore, a differing vote between the two justices could be
indicative of a feminine jurisprudence that is independent of ideology (Sherry 1986). Sherry (1986)
analyzed Establishment Clause cases and discrimination cases, because these two case issues
intersect between the interests of individualists and communitarians. The results showed that
O’Connor was more likely to adopt a community-oriented approach and often favored the wellbeing of the community over individual rights when compared to her male colleague, Chief Justice
Rehnquist; however, O’Connor rarely deviated from her conservative voting pattern and usually
voted in alignment with Rehnquist (Sherry 1986).
II. Representational Theory
Representational theory posits that women are representatives of their gender and are
expected to advance the general interest of women when serving in an institutional role (Boyd et
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al. 2010). Representation is a multi-faceted issue and often times there are dimensional
components to representation (Pitkin 1967). Representational theory assumes that women judges
fall under descriptive and substantive representation as categorized by Pitkin (1967). Not only are
women descriptively representing women citizens (i.e. demographically similar), but they are also
substantively advancing the policy interests of women (Boyd, et al. 2010). Because women have
been excluded from political decision-making historically, the presence of women allows for new
political agendas to identify and promote women’s needs. Women representatives thus feel
obligated to protect their gender class and ensure their wellbeing.
Unlike Sherry’s (1986) notion of feminine jurisprudence, a representational account would
only demonstrate effects in issues that directly pertain to women (e.g. reproductive rights,
employment discrimination, sex discrimination, and sexual harassment), because women judges
are serving as substantive representatives of their class; therefore, they are primarily interested in
making decisions that align with the policy preferences that protect and advance women’s interests
(Boyd et al. 2010).
Boyd et al. (2010) find empirical support for representational theory in their study of votes
from judges in the U.S Courts of Appeal. Boyd et al. (2010) analyzed votes in cases that directly
pertain to women’s issues (e.g. abortion, Title VII sex discrimination, and sexual harassment) as
well as cases that do not directly pertain to women’s issues (e.g. ADA, Contract Clause, federalism,
Takings Clause, Title VII race discrimination, capital punishment, campaign finance, affirmative
action, and piercing the corporate veil) (Boyd, et al. 2010). The authors test cases that do not
directly pertain to women’s issues in order to test the different voice theory; however, the data
only empirically supported representational theory in sex discrimination cases (Boyd, et al. 2010).
Since the empirical results only indicated significant differences in only one legal issue area
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pertaining to women’s issues, the results may be more supportive of informational theory, because
representational theory posits that a woman should vote differently than men on all issues that
pertain to women’s interests.
III. Informational Theory
Women possess a unique set of experiences and knowledge regarding issues that directly
pertain to women; therefore, women are expected to vote differently than their male counterparts,
who lack this experience and knowledge (Boyd, et al. 2010). Unlike representational theory,
women in this theory are not serving as representatives of any class; instead, they make decisions
utilizing their collective knowledge on issues from shared professional experiences (Boyd, et al.
2010). Because women’s decisions will be contingent on knowledge pertaining to certain firsthand experiences, individual effects may be limited to an even smaller set of cases––particularly
sex discrimination in employment (Boyd, et al. 2010). Although it is possible for informational
theory to apply to other women’s issues, it is completely dependent on the individual experiences
of each woman justice; therefore, a woman justice who has direct knowledge and personal
experiences with specific reproductive policies may make decisions differently based on her
unique knowledge and previous experience regarding the issue (Boyd, et al. 2010). Sex
discrimination in employment remains the standard metric, because most women judges and
attorneys have a professionally-shared experience of navigating as a woman in a male-dominated
occupation (Boyd, et al. 2010).
Gryski, et al. (1986) analyzed individual decision-making by U.S. state supreme court
justices in sex discrimination cases, and the results of their study showed that justices were more
likely to vote in favor of a female petitioner in a non-criminal sex discrimination case when there
was at least one woman serving on a court with a “high reputation” (Gryski, et al. 1986). A court’s
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reputation is measured by the amount of times that other courts cite a given state court’s previous
decisions in similar cases; therefore, women who serve on courts with higher reputations are seen
as credible sources of information also by other justices outside of the court and not just by justices
serving alongside women on a given court (Gryski, et al. 1986).
IV. Panel Effects
The collegial and deliberative nature of appellate courts foster an environment in which
women are able to influence their male colleagues, because a female judge can create a new range
of possible alternatives “by adding different preferences to the deliberation” (Peresie 2005). The
U.S. Supreme Court is also collegial and deliberative in nature, particularly with regard to the
majority opinion writing process (Wahlbeck, et al. 1999). Majority opinions are often the result of
multiple collaborations and influence from many justices voting in the majority; therefore,
decisions in the U.S. Supreme Court are not made in an isolated setting (Wahlbeck, et al. 1999).
Women judges are also seen as credible sources of information pertaining to women’s
issues (Boyd et al. 2010). Through this account, male judges tend to view women as being more
credible in interpreting and analyzing issues pertaining to women; therefore, male judges value
women’s judgment in certain legal issues (Peresie 2005). As such, male judges learn from their
women colleagues and begin to side more often with plaintiffs in issues pertaining to women
(Peresie 2005). Although male judges defer to their female counterparts on certain issues, their
decision to side with women judges may be strategic in nature. A male judge may side with a
woman judge in a case that is important to her in order to secure a vote in a case that may later be
important to the male judge (Peresie 2005).
Boyd et al. (2010) also find that in vertical cases argued before U.S. Courts of Appeal “not
only do males and females bring distinct approaches to these cases, but the presence of a female
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on a panel actually causes male judges to vote in a way they otherwise would not—in favor of
plaintiffs” (Boyd et al. 2010, 406). Overall, Boyd, et al. (2010) concluded that the effect of gender
in federal appellate courts is rare and not empirically significant in most cases; however, there
were consistent findings that proved individual and panel effects were significant in decisionmaking pertaining to sex discrimination disputes (Boyd, et al. 2010).
V. Critical Mass
The empirical effect of women’s presence on a high court may be subject to a certain
threshold that is required before a substantial effect can be detected (Haire and Moyer 2015, 45).
The notion of critical mass theory is grounded in the substantive shift in policy within an
institutional body once its membership crosses a threshold for a specific group (Thomas 1994).
Thomas (1994) first coined the term when discussing this threshold in legislative bodies. As higher
proportions of women were present in a subject legislative body, legislators were more likely to
push for policies that advanced the interests of women (Thomas 1994). Empirical results in studies
of legislative thresholds indicate that critical mass is reached once the legislative body is comprised
of 15-30% women (Dahlerup 2014; Swiss, et al. 2012; Childs and Krook 2006a; Bratton 2005).
Once that threshold is met, legislative policy pertaining to women begins to significantly increase.
In applying critical mass theory to courts, results have shown that women serving on U.S. district
courts are likely to decide cases more liberally when there are at least two women serving within
the same judicial district (Collins, et al. 2010). Women serving on state supreme courts also vote
differently based off of the number of other women serving on the bench (McCall 2003).
Maule (2000) applied Thomas’ (1994) critical mass theory to the Minnesota State Supreme
Court1 and found that the court had an increase in consensus when deciding family law cases

1

In 1991, the Minnesota State Supreme Court became the first state supreme court in the United States with a majority
of women judges.
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between 1985 and 1994 with a starting threshold of two women serving on the bench and ending
threshold of four women in 1994 (Maule 2000). In addition to an increase in consensus, the
Minnesota State Supreme Court also saw an increase in family law petitions filed (Maule 2000).
The increase in filings of family law petitions could be indicative that the presence of a majority
of women was sufficiently influential to increase a sense of trust in the Minnesota State Supreme
Court to make more family-oriented decisions, or the increase in filings could also be indicative
of the justices’ willingness to take on more family law cases (Maule 2000).
On paneled courts, a certain threshold of women must be reached before there is a
significant effect on voting patterns. This theory implies that there should be no quantifiable
difference between men and women’s decision-making prior to reaching critical mass. It is only
once critical mass is reached, that women begin to vote differently than men.
VI. Conformity
The mixed results of previous studies and often small differences between female and male
judicial decision-making may be a result of organizational factors. All judges undergo a relatively
uniform legal training process in order to become lawyers and judges (Guinier, et al. 1994). As
such, both men and women are expected to conform to professional norms of behavior and
decision-making.
Moreover, women are subjected to certain gender norms in the legal field that force them
to align their behavior and roles to their male colleagues (Solimine and Wheatley 1994). The legal
field is inherently masculine, and women judges and attorneys are constantly trying to “[make] it
in a man’s world” (Kritzer, et al. 1977). Additionally, women judges follow a relatively similar
pathway to judgeship through public service usually as a prosecutor or a highly successful private
practice (Kritzer, et al. 1977). Lastly, women judges and attorneys may also “overcompensate” in
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order to “prove” themselves in the hyper-masculine world of the law; therefore, they regularly
align themselves to the behaviors and thought processes of their male colleagues (Kritzer, et al.
1977).
Issues of selection bias may also affect the way women judges rule once they are appointed
or elected to the bench. When appointing the first women to high courts, the institutional bodies
ruling on their appointment may prefer judicial candidates who are most similar to male judges
currently sitting on the bench (Peresie 2005). President Carter’s first judicial appointees proved
this theory, because all women who were initially appointed to the bench demonstrated no
significant difference in decision-making when compared to their male colleagues who were
already serving on the bench (Walker and Barrow 1985). These findings are indicative of
institutions’ intent to preserve the status quo while satisfying social demands of diversification.
Additionally, the institutional bodies appointing women to courts may not have any
substantive intent by appointing a woman to a court; instead, the women are appointed to serve as
tokens on high courts (Peresie 2005). Women judges who are viewed as tokens on the court may
conform to the substantive views of their male colleagues due to pressure of legitimacy (Peresie
2005; Kanter 1977). Additionally, a token judge will attempt to align themselves as closely as
possible to the majority or the center, in order to “avoid drawing attention to the salient
characteristic which sets them off as a minority member and simultaneously obtain a legitimate
status in the eyes of the group” (Allen, et al. 1987, 233). The role of the token is solely to occupy
a descriptive role without advancing any substantive policy initiatives that deviate from the norm
(i.e. male judges’ policy agenda) (Allen, et al. 1987).
Table 1 below summarizes existing theories on gendered judicial decision-making along
with empirical expectations for each theory.
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Table 1: Existing Theories on Gendered Judicial Decision-Making
Theory
Implications
Empirical Expectation
Women develop a different notion of Qualitative, contextual
Different Voice
morality and worldview than men.
differences in decisionmaking across all legal
issue areas
Women judges serve as representatives on Women vote in favor of
Representational
the Court for women’s issues
protecting and advancing
women’s interests.
Vote differences should
only occur in cases that
pertain to women’s issues
Informational

Women judges are credible sources of
information pertaining to women’s issues
and make decisions based off of their own
unique knowledge on specific issues.

Panel Effects

Male judges should view women as being Male judges should vote
more credible in interpreting and analyzing similarly
to
women
issues pertaining to women and will defer judges on women’s issues
to women’s judgement in certain legal
issues.

Critical Mass

Panel effects require that a certain
threshold of women judges serve on the
bench before there is a quantifiable effect
in decision-making.

After a certain number of
women are appointed to a
court, women begin to
form to coalition and vote
differently than male
peers in cases pertaining
to women’s issues

Conformity

Both women and men are constrained and
trained by the same institutions (e.g. law
school,
professional
training,
and
institutional constraints of the Court);
therefore, there should be no differences in
voting behavior between men and women
holding all other explanatory factors
constant.

There should be no
differences in voting
behavior between men
and women with all other
factors held constant.
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Women should vote in
favor
of
women’s
interests that they have
direct knowledge or
personal experiences with

VII. Ecofeminist Legal Theory
In this section, I apply theories of care ethics from ecofeminism to existing theories of
different voice and feminine jurisprudence to develop and empirically test an ecofeminist legal
theory. Women exhibit higher awareness of survival and prioritize the protection of life; therefore,
women have a stronger moral approach to the survival of the environment as their relation to nature
is fundamentally different than that of men (Salleh 1997; MacGregor 2004). Different voice theory
in judicial decision-making helps bridge ecofeminism’s care ethics into judicial decision-making.
A woman judge should exhibit different responses to moral dilemmas across all legal issue areas
when compared to male judges, because a woman’s socialization and life experiences shape her
moral response to be one of community, obligation, and responsibility (Gilligan 1982; Sherry
1986). This moral connection with the environment may manifest itself in an ecofeminist legal
jurisprudence as one that favors protecting the environment above all other issues; therefore, a
woman’s inclination towards protecting the environment should not be contingent on her own
personal experiences or whether women’s interests are directly at stake, but rather she should
emphasize the protection of all life both human and non-human.
Furthermore, women have different information and experiences with the environment
since they deal more directly with it compared to men. Since the environment directly affects
family health, child raising, and public safety, informational theories of judicial decision-making
could also be applied to an ecofeminist legal theory. Many environmental cases involve much
more than just protecting the environment. Cases disputing an increase in air pollution, water
pollution, or dumping of toxic materials usually have families and children as litigants who sue for
health-related damages resulting from a company’s dumping or excessive release of toxins and
pollutants. In these types of cases, women’s experiences with child raising and maintaining family
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health should prompt them to make decisions that favor the protection of the environment in order
to ensure the safety and health of children and families.
Women’s different moral approach to nature and the protection of life––as well as their
own personal experiences with advancing the safety of families and children––should incline
women judges on the United States Supreme Court to cast votes that protect the interests of the
environment.
H1: Women judges will cast more pro-environment votes than men in cases that pertain to
environmental issues.

a. Data and Methods
In order to test my hypothesis on gendered decision-making effects in environmental cases,
I utilize the Supreme Court Database2 (“SCD”), which compiles data on cases argued before the
United States Supreme Court. Although the SCD’s data ranges from the inception of the U.S.
Supreme Court, I analyze environmental cases decided from 1997 to 2017. I choose this timeframe
to account for the increase in legislative activity pertaining to environmental policy. During the
early-1990’s, Congress and the Clinton Administration passed several amendments to existing
environmental statutes (e.g. Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, and National Environmental Policy
Act) that expanded the role of the Environmental Protection Agency in regulating pollutants and
other toxic materials. With the understanding that litigation is a lengthy process and cases often
take years to reach the U.S. Supreme Court, I use 1997 as base year to account for environmental
litigation that may have initiated at the time the environmental policy initiatives were enacted by

2

Harold J. Spaeth, Lee Epstein, et al. 2019 Supreme Court Database, Version 2019 Release 1. URL:
http://Supremecourtdatabase.org
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Congress and the Clinton Administration. I analyze cases from the SCD that pertained to the
following issues: national supremacy over natural resources; national supremacy over air
pollution; national supremacy of water pollution; environmental protection of natural resources;
federal utility regulation of gas pipelines, oil producers, gas producers, and nuclear power;
Indigenous People; and the Takings Clause or other non-constitutional governmental taking of
property. The dataset thus consists of 92 cases and 1,039 justice votes.
I am primarily interested in analyzing individual votes from justices as to whether they are
in favor of protecting the environment, so the dependent variable is coded “1” for a proenvironment (liberal) vote and “0” for a judge vote against the environment. Since the dependent
variable is dichotomous, I employ a logistic regression model.
The main independent variable of interest is the justice’s gender,3 and the variable is coded
“1” for women and “0” for men. Table 1 indicates the proportion of votes casted by woman judges
as compared to male judges.

Table 2: Proportion of Votes between Woman and Male Judges
Justice Gender
Total Number of Votes in Sample
(n = 1,039)
Female
245
Male

794

3

There are also methodological issues with utilizing a judge’s sex as the main casual variable. Since sex is considered
an inherent property of an individual, it should not be analyzed as a causal factor (Boyd, et al. 2010). Additionally,
there is an inherent ordering issue, where the sex of the judge is always determined before any other covariate property,
such as ideology (Boyd, et al. 2010). I would argue that this issue is reconciled by utilizing Simone de Beauvoir’s
infamous quote from The Second Sex: “One is not born, but rather, becomes a woman” (Beauvoir 1989). The casual
mechanisms argued through feminist legal theory are not intrinsic in nature; instead, they are a result of the
socialization and expectations that women are succumbed to through childhood and beyond.
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Control Variables
A judge’s ideology matters when making decisions (Segal and Spaeth 2002). In order to
account for this effect, I utilize Segal-Cover4 ideology scores to measure the ideology of a justice.
Segal and Cover (1989) measured justices’ ideology by analyzing newspaper editors’ assessments
of the justice before the justice was confirmed by the U.S. Senate (Segal and Cover 1989). The
Segal-Cover ideology scores had a correlation of 0.80 between the ideological score and the
justices’ votes in civil liberties cases (Segal and Cover 1989). In this sample, the Segal-Cover
ideology scores range from 0 to 0.78 with 0 being the most conservative justice in the sample and
0.78 being the most liberal justice in the sample with a mean value of 0.32.
I also control for the effects that a specific type of petitioner or respondent may have on
judicial decision-making. I include environmental organizations, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”), corporations that extract natural resources, Indigenous Peoples, and
the United States as relevant parties that may have an effect on how justices vote in cases pertaining
to the environment. Table 3 shows the frequency at which each type of party appears in the sample
as either a petitioner or respondent.
Table 3: Frequency of Control Parties Appearing as Petitioner or Respondent
Party Type
Total No. of Cases as
Total No. of Cases as
Petitioner
Respondent
Environmental Organization
5
17
U.S. EPA

8

16

Corporation Extracting
Natural Resources
Indigenous Person/Tribe

19

6

12

37

United States

14

23

4

Jeffrey A. Segal and Albert D. Cover. 1989. “Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices.”
American Political Science Review 83: 557-565.
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In cases involving the protection of natural resources and the environment, environmental
organizations and the U.S. EPA should be the best advocates for environmental protection;
therefore, the presence of an environmental organization or the U.S. EPA should incline a justice
to vote in favor of protecting the environment.
Corporations that extract natural resources should be advocating for the continued
extraction of natural resources in order to benefit their business. The following types of
corporations are included in the analysis: coal companies, oil companies, natural gas companies,
pipeline companies, lumber/logging companies, companies managing nuclear power plants, and
other mining companies (excluding coal, oil, or pipeline companies). The presence of a corporation
that extracts natural resources may incline a justice to vote against protecting the environment,
because corporations should be the best at advocating for the continued extraction of natural
resources due to their economic resources to engage in litigation and hire specialized, prestigious
lawyers who often have extensive experience arguing before the Court (Galanter 1974).
Indigenous Peoples have a spiritual connection with the environment (MacGregor 2004).
For example, indigenous women of the Keres of Laguna and Acoma Pueblos take the lead in
ensuring the protection of the environment as a tribute to the myth of Kochinnenako (Yellow
Woman), who established a contract with the non-human world through a male nature spirit in
order to secure the tribe’s survival (Parke-Sutherland 2018). Additionally, Indigenous Peoples are
subjected to higher levels of environmental injustice and dumping of environmental toxins by the
U.S. government and corporations (MacGregor 2004). For example, Hopi and Navajo women of
the Black Mesa Water Coalition protested the leasing of 65,000 acres of land in the Black Mesa
plateau in northern Arizona, and the Black Mesa Water Coalition successfully––through the
combined efforts of Hopi and Navajo women––shutdown the Peabody Coal Company’s operations
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in Black Mesa following years of protests, lawsuits, and Congressional hearings (Parke-Sutherland
2018). Because of Indigenous Peoples and individual tribes’ unique relationships with the
environment, they should serve as efficient advocates for environmental protection and addressing
environmental injustice within their tribes as stewards of the environment; therefore, the presence
of Indigenous Peoples and/or Indigenous Tribes may incline a justice to vote in favor of protecting
the environment.
The Solicitor General of the United States is an influential and highly-successful advocate
for the United States (Segal, et al. 1988; McGuire 1998). The U.S. Solicitor General hires some of
the best and most-experienced attorneys to argue and brief before the U.S. Supreme Court, and
they have repeated experience with advocating for the United States before the Court (McGuire
1998). If the United States is a party, then justices may cast a vote in favor of the United States’
position in the case.
I also control for economic factors that may affect the reasoning behind a justice’s vote to
protect the environment. I use data from the Quality of Government Basic Dataset5 to measure the
percentage of total GDP attributed to the agricultural sector and percent unemployment. If the
agricultural sector comprises a higher percentage of the country’s total GDP, a justice may be
voting against protecting the environment in order to secure arable land to sustain the country’s
economy––rather than voting to protect the environment to prevent exploitation of natural
resources. Similarly, when unemployment is high, the government is pressured to create more
employment opportunities—often through using natural resource extraction. As such, courts may

5

Dahlberg, Stefan, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Natalia Alvarado Pachon & Sofia Axelsson. 2020. The Quality of
Government Basic Dataset, version Jan20. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute,
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se doi:10.18157/qogbasjan20
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feel pressured to balance individual livelihood with environmental protection where justices are
expected to favor extraction over the environment in order to produce jobs and reduce social unrest.
b. Results
Table 4 shows the result of the logistic regression model testing the effects of gender on
justice’s vote in environmental cases while controlling for other potential explanatory factors.6 I
run two models, where Model 1 represents the full model with all cases. Model 2 excludes cases
pertaining to the Takings Clause. Cases dealing with the Takings Clause tie in directly with
ecofeminism’s arguments of exploitation of land for the benefit of capitalism, because Takings
Clause cases usually pertain to the governmental taking of land for economic and development
purposes. For this reason, I include them in my analysis. Model 2, however, acknowledges that
certain legal arguments do not categorize the Takings Clause as an environmental issue and thus
serves as a robustness check.
Table 4: Likelihood of Pro-environment Vote in the United States
Supreme Court, 1997-2019
Variable Name
Model 1
Model 2
Justice Gender
-0.587*
-0.359
(0.223)
(0.242)
Ideology
3.494**
3.452**
(0.613)
(0.637)
Environmental Organization
1.862*
1.783*
as Petitioner
(0.788)
(0.832)
Environmental Organization
-1.838**
-1.615**
as Respondent
(0.474)
(0.497)
EPA as Petitioner
1.711**
1.486**
(0.508)
(0.549)
EPA as Respondent
0.628*
0.759**
(0.394)
(0.435)
Corporation as Petitioner
-0.413
-0.076
(0.472)
(0.605)
Corporation as Respondent
0.073
-1.327*
(0.896)
(1.060)
6

Justices’ votes are likely dependent on each case, so the errors in both models are clustered around cases and the
year the case was decided, in order to account for time as well.
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Indigenous People/Tribe
as Petitioner
Indigenous People/Tribe
as Respondent
United States as Petitioner

-0.368
(0.676)
-2.491**
(0.412)
1.224**
(0.508)
-0.895**
(0.504)
0.656
(1.409)
-0.040
(0.096)
-1.117
(1.714)
1,039
-554.749
0.000

United States as Respondent
Agriculture as a % of GDP
% Unemployment
Constant
N
Log pseudolikelihood
Prob>chi2

-0.257
(0.684)
-2.519**
(0.489)
1.607**
(0.591)
-1.155**
(0.626)
-0.626
(1.836)
-0.152**
(0.099)
0.853
(2.274)
845
-431.158
0.000

Robust standard errors are noted. * = p < .05; ** = p < .01

In order to accurately interpret the results from the logistic regression model, I calculated
the marginal effects7 for each independent variable, and the marginal effects are reported below in
Table 5.
Table 5: Marginal Effects of Likelihood of a Pro-environment Vote in the
United States Supreme Court, 1997-2019
Variable Name
Model 1
Model 2
Justice Gender
-0.138*
-0.084
(0.051)
(0.055)
Ideology
0.854**
0.825**
(0.150)
(0.153)
Environmental Organization
0.405**
0.403**
as Petitioner
(0.120)
(0.143)
Environmental Organization as
-0.351**
-0.311**
Respondent
(0.065)
(0.074)
EPA as Petitioner
0.387**
0.352**
(0.089)
(0.112)
EPA as Respondent
0.155*
0.186**
(0.097)
(0.107)
Corporation as Petitioner
-0.098
-0.018
(0.107)
(0.143)
7

The marginal effects for the continuous variables in the model are calculated utilizing average marginal effects.
The average marginal effect represents the average difference expected in probability corresponding to a single-unit
increase in the continuous variable and is adjusted to the means of the other variables in the model.
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Corporation as Respondent

0.018
(0.221)
-0.087
(0.153)
-0.475**
(0.053)
0.294**
(0.110)
-0.199**
(0.099)
0.160
(0.344)
-0.010
(0.023)
1,039
-554.749
0.000

Indigenous People/Tribe
as Petitioner
Indigenous People/Tribe
as Respondent
United States as Petitioner
United States as Respondent
Agriculture as a % of GDP
% Unemployment
N
Log pseudolikelihood
Prob>chi2

-0.250**
(0.137)
-0.060
(0.154)
-0.472**
(0.063)
0.378**
(0.119)
-0.237**
(0.105)
-0.149
(0.439)
-0.036**
(0.024)
845
-431.158
0.000

Robust standard errors are noted. * = p < .05; ** = p < .01

The results from Model 1 show that there is a statistically significant difference in voting
behavior between male and female justices. A female justice is 13.8% less likely to cast a liberal
vote than a male justice.
A justice’s ideology is statistically significant, and the results show that the more liberal a
justice is, the higher the likelihood that a justice will cast a liberal vote. In this model, for every
unit increase in a justice’s Segal-Cover score, there is a corresponding 85.4% greater chance a
justice will cast a liberal vote.
Environmental organizations have a statistically significant effect on a justice’s vote when
they are present in a case as a petitioner and a respondent; however, the effect is inversed
depending on whether the environmental organization is a petitioner or respondent. When an
environmental organization is present in a case as a petitioner, there is a 40.5% greater chance that
a justice will cast a liberal vote than if there was no environmental organization present as a
petitioner. The effect is reversed when an environmental organization is present in a case as a
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respondent with justices 35.1% less likely to cast a liberal vote than if there was no environmental
organization present as a respondent.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has a statistically significant effect when
present in a case as both a petitioner and a respondent. When the U.S. EPA is present in a case as
a petitioner, a justice is 38.7% more likely to cast a liberal vote than if the U.S. EPA was not
present in a case as a petitioner. The effect is in the same direction––to a lesser degree–– when the
U.S. EPA is present in a case as a respondent. A justice is 15.5% more likely to cast a liberal vote
when the U.S. EPA is present in a case as a respondent than if the U.S. EPA was not present in the
case as a respondent.
Indigenous Peoples and tribes have a statistically significant effect on a justice’s vote but
only when they are present in a case as a respondent. A justice is 47.5% less likely to cast a liberal
vote when Indigenous Peoples and tribes are present in a case as a respondent than if Indigenous
Peoples and tribes were not present in a case as a respondent.
The United States has a statistically significant effect on a justice’s vote when present in a
case as both a petitioner and a respondent. When the United States is present in a case as a
petitioner, there is a 29.4% greater chance that a justice will cast a liberal vote than if the United
States was not present in a case as a petitioner. The effect is reversed when the United States is
present as a respondent. A justice is 19.9% less likely to cast a liberal vote when the United States
is present in a case as a respondent than if the United States was not present in a case as a
respondent.
The results of Model 2 are from decisions in environmental cases that do not include any
cases pertaining to the Takings Clause. A large number of cases in the dataset pertained to the
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Takings Clause, so I ran a separate model to ensure that there were no significant differences with
Model 1.
The results of Model 2 show that a justice’s gender does not have a statistically significant
effect. Model 2 also shows that when a corporation that extracts natural resources is present in a
case as a respondent, a justice is 25% less likely to cast a liberal vote. Additionally, unemployment
is statistically significant in Model 2 with a justice being 3.6% less likely to cast a liberal vote for
every corresponding unit increase in percent unemployment.
c. Conclusion
A woman justice is less likely to cast a liberal vote than a male judge which is the opposite
effect that I had originally predicted; however, I believe these results have several implications
and are multi-faceted.
First, I believe these results actually indicate that cases pertaining to the environment are
not entirely homogenous and not all liberal decisions equate to environmental protection. This
observation is highlighted by the presence of an environmental organization and its effect on
judicial decision-making. In many instances, environmental organizations may be engaging in
litigation against the federal government and a liberal decision in a case may actually indicate a
pro-government decision rather than a pro-environment decision. This may be the reason that we
see an inverse relationship when an environmental organization is petitioning the U.S. Supreme
Court to review a lower court decision rather than responding to a petition from an adverse party.
Justices are more likely to cast liberal votes when environmental organizations are petitioners but
are less likely to cast liberal votes when environmental organizations are respondents. This could
very well mean that casting liberal votes does not equate to protecting the environment when cases
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are between environmental organizations and the U.S. government; instead, a liberal vote is likely
indicative of the U.S. government’s interests.
The sample of cases also includes cases pertaining to the Takings Clause and other nonconstitutional governmental taking of property. In these types of cases, a liberal decision indicates
a pro-government/anti-owner vote; therefore, if women are less likely to cast a liberal vote in
Takings Clause cases, then they are more likely to be advocating against governmental taking of
property.
The results also indicate that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is a good advocate
for environmental protection. In these types of cases, there are no competing interests between the
government and environmental protection; therefore, liberal decisions should be indicative of proenvironmental stances from justices. Regardless of whether the U.S. EPA is involved in a case as
a petitioner or a respondent, justices are likely to cast liberal votes in favor of environmental
protection.
Justices are less likely to cast liberal votes in cases where Indigenous People and tribes are
present as a respondent. These results indicate that U.S. Supreme Court justices are generally
voting against the interests of Indigenous Peoples and tribes. Out of the 254 cases in the sample
where Indigenous Peoples and tribes are present as respondents, only 18 of those cases pertain to
Takings Clause; therefore, there is little chance that the negative coefficient is a result of antigovernment votes in Takings Clause cases.
Overall, I believe these results provide a promising insight to the effects of gender on
judicial decision-making in environmental cases. A judge’s gender matters when making decisions
in environmental cases, and I would argue the data shows that women judges are more likely to
protect the interests of the environment than male judges. Future research on this matter should

26

attempt a different coding scheme to address the liberal/conservative issues that arise when
identifying the direction of decisions in cases where there are conflicting interests between the
U.S. government and the environment.
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Chapter 3: Ecofeminist Language & Dissenting Opinions
I. Ecofeminism and Linguistics
Linguistics and concept formation can also be used to draw connections between women
and nature. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) argues that concept formation can be analyzed by the way
an individual uses language to discuss themselves and the world around them. In most cultures,
language is critical in perpetuating a sexist-naturist dialogue which sees women and nonhuman
nature as less than men (Mack-Canty 2004). Specifically, the English language promotes
naturalizing and animalizing women by comparing them to certain animals or parts of nature are
already viewed to be inferior to men (Adams 1990). Women can be referred to as bitches, chicks,
whales, queen bees, snakes, pets, bunnies, and social butterflies; however, men are usually referred
to animals that are usually not exploited to the same degree as the animals which women are
referred to (e.g. lions, wolves, tigers, eagles, etc.). The English language also feminizes nature. It
is Mother Nature, not Father Nature, which has its resources extracted, controlled, exploited, and
penetrated. Fertile soil, not potent soil, is the one that is farmed and utilized over and over until it
is deemed useless by man (i.e. it can no longer provide resources to the man’s benefit).
The way we talk about ourselves and the world around us matters. Language formation and
cultural formation work vis-à-vis to perpetuate patriarchal domination of women and nature by
incorporating language that feminizes nature and naturalizes women (Adams 1990).
II. Data and Methods
I test linguistic theories of ecofeminism by qualitatively analyzing dissenting opinions
written by justices of the United States Supreme Court in six environmental cases found within
the sample of cases utilized in Chapter 2. A qualitative analysis is adequate and necessary for many
reasons. First, a qualitative analysis serves as a consolidatory medium to address epistemological
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conflicts between ecofeminism and my quantitative analysis of justices’ votes. Qualitative research
grounds itself primarily on an interpretivist epistemology––rather than the positivist epistemology
that quantitative research relies on (Webley 2010). Analyzing social phenomena through an
interpretivist epistemology allows for a deeper understanding of social behavior and the structural
relations produced as a result of that social behavior (Webley 2010).
Second, a qualitative analysis following a quantitative analysis may aid in explaining the
phenomenon observed quantitatively in greater detail (Kritzer 2009). Qualitative analyses are
equally capable of testing causal and descriptive inferences and producing valid results (King,
Keohane, and Verba 1994). A qualitative analysis is much smaller with regard to data points than
a quantitative analysis; however, the data analyzed through a qualitative analysis is considered to
be more contextual and in-depth than single observations within a quantitative analysis (Webley
2010). By analyzing written court opinions, which provide legal reasoning and context beyond a
singular vote, I am able to examine alternatives and other explanatory factors for the results of the
quantitative analysis in Chapter 2.
Current practices for qualitative document analysis rely heavily on coding schemes and a
statistical analysis of content and discourse of written documents (Webley 2010); however, coding
written documents and analyzing written content statistically shifts the analysis back to a positivist
epistemology, which undermines the very premise of ecofeminism’s epistemology emphasizing
multiple, dynamic understandings of knowledge and value. Instead, I analyze written dissents that
compares writing styles between women and men in environmental cases. Interpretivist
approaches to analyzing written documents emphasize the researcher’s frame of reference, because
“no-one is capable of being objective, all meaning being socially constructed” (Webley 2010, 5).
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I analyze solo-authored dissenting opinions instead of majority opinions for two reasons.
First, dissenting opinions are not binding law, so justices have more freedom to express themselves
and provide critiques against the majority’s decision (Wahlbeck, et al. 1999). Secondly, a majority
decision is a product of negotiation and compromise, so the language cannot be easily attributed
to particular majority coalition members, such as the majority opinion writer. Majority opinions
are circulated and often times have several sections added or omitted by other justices that are
signing on to the majority opinion (Wahlbeck, et al. 1999). A dissenting opinion should have a
more centralized and isolated voice that speaks to the intentions and thoughts of the justice writing
the opinion; therefore, analyzing solo-authored dissenting opinions will provide the best
framework for comparing women and men’s voices when discussing environmental matters.
I randomly8 select six dissenting opinions written in environmental cases with three
opinions authored by women9 and three authored by men. These cases are selected from the sample
of cases analyzed in the quantitative section of this paper; therefore, the dissenting opinions
analyzed in this chapter were not randomly selected from all environmental cases heard by the
U.S. Supreme Court. Out of the six dissenting opinions two are written by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, one is written by Justice Elena Kagan, two are written by Justice John Paul Stevens, and
one is written by Justice Antonin Scalia.10

8

When randomly selecting dissenting opinions from women justices, all cases selected at random contained a
dissenting opinion written by Justice Ginsburg; therefore, I had to identify a case in the dataset that did not contain a
dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg in order to ensure a degree of variety in authorship from the available
opinions written by women.
9
There were no dissenting opinions from Justice Sotomayor or Justice Breyer in the dataset used to analyze dissenting
opinions. Future analysis of Justice Sotomayor’s written opinions will be especially beneficial to discourse regarding
the impacts of intersectionality on language and perceptions of the environment. Future research can also benefit from
analyzing Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinions to determine if ideology is a stronger influence than gender on
linguistics in written opinions, since Justice Breyer is often seen as the “most liberal” male judge on the Court.
10
The dataset analyzed in the quantitative portion of this paper contained a limited number of dissenting opinions––
particularly dissenting opinions written by women. For this reason, there are two opinions written by Justice Ginsburg
and two opinions written by Justice Stevens, as they were part of a limited number of dissenting opinions. Future
research on dissenting opinions should analyze written opinions from all available environmental cases to increase
diversity among authoring justices.
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III. Dissenting Opinion Analysis
Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the Navy, et al. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al.
555 U.S. 7 (2008)
Natural Resources Defense Council filed for an injunction in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California in response to the U.S. Navy carrying out exercises in southern
California waters.
Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NAPA”), the U.S. Navy was
required to prepare an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) in order to assess the risks and
potential dangers their exercises could have on marine life in the area. The U.S. Navy emphasized
its intent to carry out the EIS; however, it proceeded with its exercises prior to the completion of
the EIS. Natural Resources Defense Council argued that the mid-frequency active sonar used
during these exercises would cause significant harm to marine mammals in southern California
waters. In order to bypass the requirements set forth by NAPA, the U.S. Navy sought relief from
the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”), and the CEQ, an advisory council within the
Executive Branch, granted an exemption and provided alternative arrangements that allowed the
U.S. Navy to continue their exercises without an EIS. The District Court granted Natural Resources
Defense Council’s petition for injunction and specifically cited the “possibility of irreparable
harm” to marine mammals in southern California waters as grounds for injunction. The U.S.
District Court also stated that CEQ could not, under its authority, provide the U.S. Navy with
“alternative arrangements” to bypass the EIS requirement.
The U.S. Navy appealed on the grounds that the U.S. District Court abused its discretion
by granting an injunction that prevented exercises that the U.S. Navy saw as an “emergency
circumstance” outlined by NAPA and were therefore allowed to carry out the exercises prior to
completing an EIS.
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The majority held in a 5-4 decision that the U.S. District Court abused its discretion by
granting an injunction solely on the grounds of the “possibility” of an irreparable harm to marine
mammals. The majority argued that the legal standard for an injunction cannot be a “possibility”
of an irreparable harm; instead, the petitioner needs to prove that without an injunction the
irreparable will be likely. Additionally, the majority held that the naval exercises were in the
public’s interest and outweighed any irreparable harm to marine wildlife. Lastly, the majority held
that a U.S. District Court must provide an alternative for persuading the U.S. Navy to comply with
completing an EIS rather than an injunction.
Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion arguing that the U.S. District Court did not
abuse its discretion in granting an injunction preventing the U.S. Navy to continue its exercises
until an EIS was completed by the U.S. Navy. Justice Ginsburg argues that had the U.S. Navy
completed the EIS prior to commencing their exercises, “the parties and the public could have
benefited from the environmental analysis––and the Navy’s training could have proceeded without
interruption” (Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. 2008).
The U.S. Navy’s own environmental assessment predicted that there would be irreparable
harm to marine mammals, specifically with their use of sonar. Justice Ginsburg’s emphasis on the
significant harm to marine mammals is worth noting:
“In my view, this likely harm––170,000 behavioral disturbances, including 8,000
instances of temporary hearing loss; and 564 Level A harms, including 436 injuries
to a beaked whale population numbering only 1,121––cannot be lightly dismissed,
even in the face of an alleged risk to the effectiveness of the Navy’s 14 training
exercises” (Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. 2008).
Justice Ginsburg does not dispute whether the U.S. Navy’s exercises are important;
however, military interests do not always take precedent, especially when high-scale damage to
marine life is very likely. Justice Ginsburg ends her dissenting opinion by stating that
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“Environmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money
damages and is often permanent or at least of long duration, i.e., irreparable. If such
injury is sufficiently likely, therefore, the balance of harms will usually favor the
issuance of an injunction to protect the environment” (Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc. 2008).
Justice Ginsburg’s assessment of environmental injury and her emphasis on the harms to
marine mammals in the present case could be indicative of her perceptions of what environmental
protection should consist of within the courts (i.e. non-human protection of life is more important
than the interests of the U.S. Navy). It is also important to note that Justice Ginsburg perceived the
public interest to be one of protecting the environment and marine wildlife rather than the placing
the public interests in the continued military exercises carried out by the U.S. Navy.
Michigan, et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al. 576 U.S. __ (2015)
Congress passed amendments to the Clean Air Act in 1990 that created a framework for
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to regulate hazardous air pollutants,
specifically mercury, from “stationary sources” that released air pollutants in high quantities. By
regulating these hazardous air pollutants, the EPA was directed to also conduct cost-benefit
analyses to gauge the effects and total cost on the industry to regulate air pollutants. Congress also
modified the Clean Air Act to allow the EPA to regulate power plants in an effort to curb rising
levels of acid rain in areas where power plants were operating. Following a public health study
that concluded that power plants, specifically electric utility steam-generating units, are the
“largest non-natural source of mercury emissions,” the EPA decided that it was “appropriate and
necessary” to regulate the emissions from power plants. Michigan, along with 22 other states and
several industries, sued the EPA on the grounds that the agency did not take into consideration the
cost of regulating the power plants when the agency decided to regulate the power plants. The EPA
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argued that its decision was solely the triggering event for a multi-stage regulatory process that
would, at some point, include a cost-benefit analysis before implementing an emission limit.
The majority held in a 5-4 decision that the EPA did not consider costs when making its
decision to regulate power plants’ emissions and unreasonably interpreted the “appropriate and
necessary” provision of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.
Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion arguing that the EPA had the full intent of
taking costs into account when regulating power plants, and it would be unreasonable to expect
the agency to conduct a thorough cost-benefit analysis at the initial stages of the regulatory process.
Justice Kagan also argues that the courts cannot interfere with the agency’s regulatory decisions
after the agency has determined that regulation is “appropriate and necessary,” because “EPA’s
experience and expertise in that arena––and courts’ lack of those attributes––demand that judicial
review proceed with caution and care” (Michigan v. E.P.A. 2015). Justice Kagan also emphasizes
that the regulatory process, specifically with regard to setting emissions levels, can be a “lengthy
and complicated process” that often times requires years-worth of studies to truly assess costs and
benefits.
Justice Kagan also critiques the majority’s argument regarding “interpretive gerrymander”
that the EPA, according to the majority, only considered environmental effects and not costs when
deciding that it was “appropriate and necessary” to regulate power plants’ emissions. The majority
uses a sport-car metaphor to liken the EPA to a driver who believes it is “appropriate” to buy a
Ferrari but fails to account for the cost, because “he plans to think about cost later when deciding
whether to upgrade the sound system” (Michigan v. E.P.A. 2015). Justice Kagan responds by
stating that
“The comparison is witty but wholly inapt. To begin with, emissions limits are not
a luxury good: They are a safety measure, designed to curtail the significant health
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and environmental harms caused by power plants spewing hazardous pollutants”
(Michigan v. E.P.A. 2015).
Justice Kagan instead provides her own car metaphor by comparing the EPA to a driver
who decides that it is “appropriate and necessary” to replace her worn-out brake pads without
initially considering cost; however, she is well aware that she has enough time to evaluate costs
and explore different options to stay within her budget, because of her prior experience with
replacing worn-out brake pads.
Justice Kagan’s critique of the majority’s car metaphor could be interpreted as a critique
on the masculine themes found within the majority’s opinion, as well. Justice Kagan downplays
the metaphor by categorizing it as “witty but wholly inapt,” and she reminds the majority that the
issue at hand has much larger implications than buying a car (i.e. public health and the environment
are directly at risk as a result of power plants’ pollutants). It is also worth noting that Justice Kagan
switches the pronouns used by the majority from “he” to “she” in her own reinterpretation of the
car purchase metaphor.
Justice Kagan concludes her dissenting opinion by stating that “the [majority’s decision]
is a decision that deprives the American public of the pollution control measures that the
responsible Agency, acting well within its delegated authority, found would save many, many
lives” (Michigan v. E.P.A. 2015).
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, et al. 557 U.S. 261 (2009)
Coeur Alaska proposed a discharge of 210,000 gallons a day of wastewater from its gold
mine into Lower Slate Lake located in Alaska’s Tongass National Forest. The wastewater would
include concentrations of certain toxic metals, including aluminum, copper, lead, and mercury. An
estimated 4.5 million tons of solid waste would be discharged into the lake and raise the lake’s
bottom elevation by 50 feet. The Southeast Alaska Conservation Council sued Coeur Alaska, Inc.
35

on the grounds that the discharge would be in violation of the EPA’s standards, governed by
Section 306 of the Clean Water Act, of discharging waste into the waters of the United States.
Coeur Alaska argued that their proposed discharge was not subject to regulation by the EPA, but
instead was governed by the Army Corps of Engineers through Section 404 of the Clean Water
Act.
The majority held in a 6-3 decision that the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers has the authority
to regulate the discharge and grant permits to Coeur Alaska and other similar companies intending
on discharging wastewater.
Justice Ginsburg issued a dissenting opinion arguing that any discharge that is subject to a
performance standard through the Clean Water Act should be exclusively regulated by the EPA.
Justice Ginsburg emphasizes Congress’ intent behind the Clean Water Act which was primarily to
“eliminate, by 1985, the discharge of all pollutants into the Nation’s navigable waters” (Coeur
Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council 2009). There is room for Sections 306 and 404 of
the Clean Water Act to operate simultaneously as long as Section 404 does not allow for permits
to discharge pollutants that would otherwise be prohibited by Section 306. Justice Ginsburg warns
of the effects that allowing for an override of Section 306 could have on future pollution-control
standards, because the new standard would simply be that a permit could be issued if the
discharged pollutant(s) contain “sufficient solid matter to raise the bottom of a water body,
transformed into a waste disposal facility” (Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council
2009). Justice Ginsburg goes on to state that “providing an escape hatch for polluters whose
discharges contain solid matter, it bears noting, is particularly perverse; the Act specifically
focuses on solids as harmful pollutants” (Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council
2009).
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The majority’s decision, according to Ginsburg, completely undermines the purpose of the
Clean Water Act and opens the door for the waters of the United States to be used as “settling
ponds.” In a footnote, Justice Ginsburg critiques Justice Breyer on the alleged safeguards that
would help continue enforcement of performance standards.
“Given today's decision, it is optimistic to expect that EPA or the courts will act
vigorously to prevent evasion of performance standards. Nor is EPA's veto power
under § 404(c) of the Clean Water Act an adequate substitute for adherence to §
306. That power—exercised only a dozen times over 36 years encompassing more
than one million permit applications, see Brief for American Rivers 14—hinges on
a finding of “unacceptable adverse effect,” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c). Destruction of
nearly all aquatic life in a pristine lake apparently does not qualify as
‘unacceptable’” (Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council 2009).
Justice Ginsburg’s use of imagery in her concluding sentence cannot go unnoticed. Her use
of the word “pristine” to describe the lake, that earlier in her opinion she argued would be
perversely polluted, could be interpreted as a ecofeminist critique against the exploitation of a
“pristine” lake to be used as a dumping site for waste pursuant to the majority’s decision.
National Association of Home Builders, et al. v. Defenders of Wildlife, et al. 551 U.S. 644 (2007)
Under the Clean Water Act, the EPA is allowed to transfer authority to regulate a National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) upon the application of a state, as long as the
state meets nine criteria outlined by the Clean Water Act. In 2002, Arizona applied for a transfer
of authority from the EPA, so the state could administer its own NPDES. Upon Arizona’s
application, the EPA consulted with the Fish and Wildlife Services (“FWS”) to determine if the
transfer would have any adverse effect on listed species. FWS concluded that the transfer would
not have any direct effect on water quality that would adversely affect certain species; however,
FWS believed that the transfer could potentially violate Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species
Act of 1973 (“ESA”). FWS argued that a transfer could potentially result in more discharge permits
from the state which would allow for growth in land development, ultimately affecting certain
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endangered species in Arizona. The EPA disagreed and granted the permit arguing that as long as
the state met the nine criteria, the EPA would not be responsible for any future impacts related to
projects requiring state-issued NPDES permits. The Defenders of Wildlife sued to challenge the
transfer and argued that the EPA’s decision would be independently subject to the requirements
set forth by the ESA.
The majority held in a 5-4 decision that the EPA’s transfer to Arizona was not subject to
the provisions protecting endangered species, because the transfer was considered a “nondiscretionary” action; therefore, the EPA is only bound by the nine criterion outlined by the Clean
Water Act, and the provisions of the ESA are only applicable to discretionary actions of federal
agencies.
Justice John Paul Stevens issued a dissenting opinion arguing that the ESA should apply
to all federal agency actions––both discretionary and non-discretionary. Justice Stevens relies on
precedent in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (also known as the “snail darter” case) where the
Court held that the intent behind the ESA was to place endangered species above all other “primary
missions” in federal agencies. In Hill, the Court found that the survival of the snail fish would
require a $100 million project to be permanently halted due to the strict provisions of the ESA.
Justice Stevens argues that the Court’s decision in Hill demands that the CWA and the EPA yield
to the provisions outlined in the ESA.
Following the Court’s decision in Hill, Congress amended the ESA and created the
Endangered Species Committee which was granted authority to issue exemptions to the ESA and
essentially “approve the extinction of an endangered species” (Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v.
Defs. of Wildlife 2007). Due to the committee’s authority to approve the extinction of a species,
the committee is often referred to as the “God Squad” or “God Committee.” Justice Stevens argues
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that the creation of the committee is indicative of Congress recognizing that some conflicts with
the ESA cannot be resolved without the permanent sacrifice of some endangered species.
Justice Stevens’ inclusion of the “colloquial” term “God Squad” or “God Committee”
when referring to the Endangered Species Committee is particularly interesting. His inclusion of
the term “God Squad” can be interpreted to be a masculine justification for the committee’s
authority to “approve” the extinction of an endangered species. Justice Stevens upholds the ESA
throughout his dissenting opinion; however, he seems to depart from the total authority that the
ESA should have when discussing the “God Squad.” Justice Stevens grants a “pass” when it comes
to approving the extinction of an endangered species when the approval comes from a committee
with a hyper-masculine terminology ascribed to its identity and duties.
Justice Stevens concludes his dissenting opinion by stating that the majority’s decision
completely disregards the Court’s decision in Hill and “places a great number of endangered
species in jeopardy, including the cactus ferruginous pygmy-owl and Pima pineapple cactus at
issue here” (Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife 2007).
Friends of the Earth, Inc., et al. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. 528 U.S. 167
(2000)
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. (“Laidlaw”) obtained a wastewater treatment
plant and subsequently was granted a NPDES permit that authorized Laidlaw to discharge limited
pollutants into the North Tyger River in South Carolina. Laidlaw repeatedly exceeded the
discharge of mercury allowed by the permit, and Friends of the Earth ultimately filed a citizen suit
against Laidlaw alleging violation of the NPDES and sought an award of civil penalties against
Laidlaw. Laidlaw argued that the Friends of the Earth did not have standing to sue, because Friends
of the Earth could not demonstrate a concrete injury as a result of the exceeded dumping of
mercury into the North Tyger River. Laidlaw also argued that the issue had become moot, because
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it had complied with the terms of the NPDES following the filing of the suit from Friends of the
Earth.
The majority held in a 7-2 decision that the issue in controversy cannot be dismissed as
moot due to Laidlaw’s compliance following the commencement of litigation. The majority went
on to state that “a defendant’s voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct ordinarily does
not suffice to moot a case” (Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc. 2000).
The majority also argued that Friends of the Earth had standing to bring forth a suit on behalf of
its members, because they were able to prove injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Lastly,
the majority argued that the civil penalties imposed by the U.S. District Court served both as a
catalyst for immediate compliance and a deterrent for future violations.
While the legal question remained primarily procedural, Justice Antonin Scalia’s
dissenting opinion offers insights into his perception of environmental harms as remediable harms
in the courts. Justice Scalia issued a dissenting opinion arguing that the Friends of the Earth were
not able to demonstrate an injury in fact and therefore had no standing to bring suit against Laidlaw.
Justice Scalia emphasizes the need for a connection between the harms to the environment and a
direct harm to the individual bringing forth the suit.
“Ongoing ‘concerns’ about the environment are not enough, for ‘[i]t is the reality
of the threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the standing inquiry, not the
plaintiff’s subjective apprehensions’” (internal quotes pertain to Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983)) (Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.
(TOC), Inc. 2000).
It is worth discussing that in every iteration of the terms “environmental concerns” or
“environmental harms,” Justice Scalia religiously places the term “concerns” or “harms” in
quotation marks as to indicate that the environmental concerns or harms asserted by Friends of the
Earth, or any party asserting an environmental harm or concern, are not legitimate.
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Justice Scalia states his concerns regarding evidence presented in the form of affidavits in
the U.S. District Court that were used to prove up the plaintiffs’ damages and concerns regarding
the potential effects that continued violations by Laidlaw could have on their lives. Justice Scalia
continues to deny plaintiffs’ standing stating that
“[b]y accepting plaintiffs’ vague, contradictory, and unsubstantiated allegations of
‘concern’ about the environment as adequate to prove injury in fact, and accepting
them even in the face of a finding that the environment was not demonstrably
harmed, the Court makes the injury-in-fact requirement a sham” (Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc. 2000).
Justice Scalia also critiques the majority’s decision to allow private citizens to pursue
public civil penalties paid directly to the U.S. Treasury. Particularly, the issue of redressability and
individual relief is absent when civil penalties are paid to the government rather than the private
citizen; therefore, Justice Scalia argues that this mechanism essentially allows for a plaintiff to act
as a “self-appointed mini-EPA” to enforce environmental laws and regulations through the courts.
Monsanto Co., et al. v. Geertson Seed Farms, et al. 561 U.S. 139 (2010)
Monsanto Co. (“Monsanto”) and Forage Genetics International (“FGI”) genetically
engineered the alfalfa genome to be resistant to Roundup, an herbicide originally produced by
Monsanto. Under the Plant Protection Act (“PPA”) the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(“APHIS”) must regulate genetically-engineered plants in order to assess their risk to other
naturally-present plants in the United States; therefore, companies that genetically engineer plants,
such as Monsanto, must comply with NEPA and PPA by completing an EIS to determine the
environmental effects the plant may have. APHIS began deregulating Roundup Ready Alfalfa
(“RRA”) without the completion of an EIS, and Geertson Seed Farms (“Geertson”), along with
Trask Family Seeds (“Trask”), petitioned a U.S. District Court to issue an injunction preventing
the distribution of RRA seeds until an EIS is completed. The U.S. District Court granted the

41

injunction on the grounds that there was sufficient evidence to prove that RRA would lead to crosspollination with traditional alfalfa crops and ultimately eradicate the conventional alfalfa plant.
The majority held in a 7-1 decision that the U.S. District Court abused its discretion by
granting the injunction without holding an evidentiary hearing to establish the requirements for an
injunction, specifically citing to Winter, et al. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al.
555 U.S. 7 (2008) in which the Court held that a NEPA violation does not indicate that injunction
relief is available.
Justice John Paul Stevens issued a dissenting opinion arguing that the U.S. District Court
had sufficient findings of fact that supported the injunction. Justice Stevens states that the majority
did not dispute the U.S. District Court’s findings of fact that included the following: RRA is proven
to contaminate other plants through cross-pollination, controlled planting has still led to crosspollination, the APHIS does not have the resources available to enforce any limitations on planting,
and contamination of the conventional alfalfa crop can “decimate farmers’ livelihoods and the
American alfalfa market for years to come” (Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms 2010).
Justice Stevens places significant weight on the environmental impacts that RRA could
have when a gene transfer occurs. The findings of fact also included that “gene transfer can and
does occur, and that if it were to spread through open land the environmental and economic
consequences would be devastating” (Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms 2010). Justice
Stevens also states that “limits on planting or harvesting may operate fine in a laboratory setting,
but the District Court concluded that many limits will not be followed and cannot be enforced in
the real world” (Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms 2010).
Justice Stevens concludes his dissenting opinion standing by the U.S. District Court’s
decision to grant the injunction.
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“Confronted with those disconcerting submissions, with APHIS’s unlawful
deregulation decision, with a group of farmers who had staked their livelihoods on
APHIS’s decision, and with a federal statute that prizes informed decisionmaking
on matters that seriously affect the environment, the court did the best it could”
(Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms 2010).
When comparing Justice Stevens’ written opinion in Monsanto to the dissenting opinion
in National Association of Home Builders, there is a clearer concern with environmental harm in
Monsanto with a more neutral and ungendered approach in language. In Monsanto, Justice
Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor voted with the majority; therefore, Justice Stevens was the sole
dissenter in this case. His concerns for the cross-contamination of crops, specifically alfalfa, and
the sensitivity to the individual concerns of the farmers who sought the injunction on behalf of
countless of smaller farms across the nation are worth discussing in light of Vandana Shiva’s
ecofeminist arguments on preserving agricultural techniques and protecting the livelihood of
natural seeds against companies like Monsanto.
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Chapter 4: Conclusion
This study introduces a new theory to judicial and gendered decision-making scholarship
by synthesizing an ecofeminist legal theory through existing theories of judicial decision-making
and ecofeminism.
From a quantitative standpoint, women judges appear to vote differently than men in cases
pertaining to the environment. Although women are less likely to cast “liberal” votes in
environmental cases, I argue that this finding should not be interpreted as an anti-environment
stance from women on the U.S. Supreme Court. Instead, future research should attempt to employ
a different coding scheme that is exclusive to environmental cases that differentiates between a
pro-government and pro-environment decision when both government and environmental interest
are at odds in the same litigation. The dataset used for this study is in no way tailored to
environmental cases, but it contains a sufficiently large sample to offer an initial analysis of voting
patterns. Additionally, the results indicate that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency serves
as a successful advocate for the environment when arguing before the U.S. Supreme Court. Future
studies may also be interested in analyzing the mechanisms behind the EPA’s successful track
record on the Court.
Future studies may also control for a justice’s race and examine the effects of race and
gender on environmental decision-making in U.S. courts. Because different groups with
intersectional identities across gender, race, ethnicity, and class—among others—have distinct
relationships with the environment, looking at a less homogenous group of justices would be
beneficial. U.S. appellate courts, for example, have greater diversity than the U.S. Supreme Court,
and this study could be further extended to state high court decisions as well.
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Furthermore, future research should also analyze countries other than the United States.
Other countries have different laws and regulations regarding the environment, as well as a
different demographic of judges on their respective high courts. Cultural, economic, and religious
differences define their relationship with the environment in ways that differ from American
modes of conceptualization, policy priorities, and perceived needs. Similarly, the degree of
environmental protections ensured through indigenous rights, such as policies pertaining to
indigenous stewardship or indigenous collective property titles, vary significantly across countries.
Taking a more international comparative approach would offer a better understanding of how
gender relates to the environment across these contexts.
The linguistic analysis of justices’ written dissenting opinions also provides promising
insight to the future of gender effects on environmental litigation before the U.S. Supreme Court.
Justices Ginsburg and Kagan demonstrated a clear concern with the protection of human and nonhuman, as well as implementing ecofeminist language within in their opinions. When compared
to Justice Ginsburg and Justice Kagan, Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia demonstrated
significantly different concerns when discussing the environment. Justice Stevens continued to use
masculine themes and language in his dissenting opinions, even though he was generally
advocating for the protection of the environment. Future studies may perform a comprehensive
content analysis to statistically analyze written opinions and detect the frequency of certain
ecofeminist terms or themes.
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